Theory of mind broad and narrow: Reasoning about social exchange engages ToM areas, precautionary reasoning does not
Theory of mind broad and narrow: Reasoning about social exchange engages ToM areas, precautionary reasoning does not
复制标题
DOI：
10.1080/17470910600989771
复制
发表时间：
2006-09-01
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Miller, Michael B.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ermer, Elsa;Guerin, Scoft A.;Miller, Michael B.
Baron-Cohen（1995）提出心理理论（ToM）推理系统的进化是为了促进策略性社会互动。社会交换——一种互利合作的形式——涉及战略性的社会互动，需要ToM对其他个体心理状态的内容进行推断，尤其是他们的欲望、目标和意图。在关于社会交换的推理和关于利用其他更一般的内容领域的等价问题的推理之间存在着行为和神经心理学上的分离。因此，有人提出社会交换行为是由社会契约算法调节的：社会契约算法是一种特定领域的推理系统，在功能上专门用于对社会交换进行推理。我们报告了一项使用沃森选择任务的功能磁共振成像研究，为这一假设提供了进一步的支持。预防性规则与社会交换规则有很多共同的特性——它们是有条件的、道义的、涉及主观效用的——以至于大多数推理理论都声称它们是由相同的神经计算机制处理的。然而，神经成像显示，关于社会交换的推理激活了大脑中没有被关于预防规则的推理激活的区域，反之亦然。正如预测的那样，当受试者解释社会交换规则时，ToM的神经相关区域（前叶和后叶皮层）被激活，而不是预防性规则（在这种情况下，ToM推理是不必要的）。我们认为ToM和社会契约算法之间的交互可以是相互的：社会契约算法需要ToM推理，但它们的功能逻辑也允许ToM推理。通过考虑狭义的ToM（信念欲望推理）和所有创造人类社会互动逻辑的社会推理系统之间的相互作用——这些系统能够并使用关于心理状态内容的推理——一个更广泛的ToM概念可能会出现：一个体现人性理论（ToHN）的计算模型。
Baron-Cohen (1995) proposed that the theory of mind (ToM) inference system evolved to promote strategic social interaction. Social exchange-a form of co-operation for mutual benefit -involves strategic social interaction and requires ToM inferences about the contents of other individuals' mental states, especially their desires, goals, and intentions. There are behavioral and neuropsychological dissociations between reasoning about social exchange and reasoning about equivalent problems tapping other, more general, content domains. It has therefore been proposed that social exchange behavior is regulated by social contract algorithms: a domain-specific inference system that is functionally specialized for reasoning about social exchange. We report an fMRI study using the Wason selection task that provides further support for this hypothesis. Precautionary rules share so many properties with social exchange rules-they are conditional, deontic, and involve subjective utilities-that most reasoning theories claim they are processed by the same neurocomputational machinery. Nevertheless, neuroimaging shows that reasoning about social exchange activates brain areas not activated by reasoning about precautionary rules, and vice versa. As predicted, neural correlates of ToM (anterior and posterior temporal cortex) were activated when subjects interpreted social exchange rules, but not precautionary rules (where ToM inferences are unnecessary). We argue that the interaction between ToM and social contract algorithms can be reciprocal: social contract algorithms requires ToM inferences, but their functional logic also allows ToM inferences to be made. By considering interactions between ToM in the narrower sense (belief desire reasoning) and all the social inference systems that create the logic of human social interaction-ones that enable as well as use inferences about the content of mental states-a broader conception of ToM may emerge: a computational model embodying a Theory of Human Nature (ToHN).