Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly Revisited: An Extension to Stackelberg Competition
Alternative Strategies of a Public Enterprise in Oligopoly Revisited: An Extension to Stackelberg Competition
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重新审视寡头垄断中公共企业的替代策略：斯塔克尔伯格竞争的延伸
DOI：
10.1111/boer.12077
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发表时间：
2016
影响因子：
0.8
通讯作者：
Kojun Hamada
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lee;Hiro;Kojun Hamada
本文回顾了De Fraja和Delbono（1989）这篇关于混合寡头垄断的开创性论文，以便更多地关注Stackelberg竞争。首先，我们表明，即使在古诺竞争中，如果私人公司的数量足够小，私有化也必然会减少社会福利。其次，我们证明了当一家上市公司在私有化之前和之后都是斯塔克尔伯格领导者时，私有化必然会减少福利，而与私营公司的数量无关。此外，我们表明，即使一家上市公司仍然是追随者，如果私营公司的数量相对较少，私有化也会减少福利。
This paper revisits De Fraja and Delbono (1989), which is the seminal paper on mixed oligopoly, in order to pay more attention to Stackelberg competition. First, we show that, even in Cournot competition, if the number of private firms is sufficiently small, privatization necessarily reduces social welfare. Second, we demonstrate that when a public firm is a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily reduces welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Moreover, we show that even when a public firm remains a follower, privatization reduces welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.