The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits: a comparative analysis of European delegation
The creation of European regulatory agencies and its limits: a comparative analysis of European delegation
复制标题
欧洲监管机构的设立及其局限性：欧洲代表团的比较分析
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
2011
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
M. Thatcher
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Thatcher
欧洲联盟（欧盟）一级的机构创建不同于国家一级。欧洲监管机构的正式权力有限，与其他行为者分离，类似于网络而不是独立的机构。用于经济监管的电子逆向拍卖比用于社会监管的电子逆向拍卖建立得晚，数量也少。使用历史理性分析，本文认为，过去的代表团在欧盟和国家层面的其他非多数主义机构的条件，欧洲机构的创建。委员会捍卫了其现有的作用和权力，在电子逆向拍卖有助于委员会扩大自身影响力的战略时接受电子逆向拍卖，并确保委员会对电子逆向拍卖拥有多种控制权。当成员国设立独立监管机构时，这些监管机构捍卫其自主权，抵制强有力的电子逆向拍卖。欧盟正式的独立监管机构网络阻碍了强有力的电子逆向拍卖的建立，而一旦建立，电子逆向拍卖就涉及这些网络的分层和转换。因此，对电子逆向拍卖的正式授权是有限和不均衡的。
Agency creation at the European Union (EU) level differs from that at the national one. European regulatory agencies (ERAs) have limited formal powers and separation from other actors, resembling networks rather than stand-alone agencies. ERAs for economic regulation have been created later and in smaller numbers than for social regulation. Using a historical rational analysis, this paper argues that past delegations to other non-majoritarian institutions at the EU and national levels condition the creation of European agencies. The Commission has defended its existing role and powers, accepting ERAs when they aid its strategy to increase its own reach and ensuring that it has many controls over them. When member states have created independent regulatory agencies (IRAs), those IRAs have defended their autonomy and resisted strong ERAs. Formalized EU networks of IRAs have hindered the establishment of powerful ERAs and when created, ERAs have involved layering and conversion of those networks. Hence formal delegation to ERAs has been limited and uneven.