Minorities and Endogenous Segregation
Minorities and Endogenous Segregation
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少数群体和内生隔离
DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.00368.x
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发表时间：
2006
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
J. Eeckhout
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Eeckhout
本文对婚姻市场随机匹配模型中的隔离现象进行了理论分析。否则，相同的伴侣会有一个与回报无关的特征——颜色。我们导出了一组色盲均衡，并证明了它们是一般约束的低效均衡。均衡隔离策略是以匹配类型为条件的策略。结果表明，存在这样的类型分布，即隔离均衡支付帕累托优于色盲支付。在其他分配中，种族隔离也会产生冲突，多数人无疑会获利，而少数人可能会输。给予优惠待遇，即少数群体偏见，可以增加整体福利。Wiley-Blackwell版权所有。
A theoretical analysis is proposed of segregation as an equilibrium phenomenon in a random-matching model of the marriage market. Otherwise identical partners possess a pay-off-irrelevant characteristic, colour. We derive the set of colour-blind equilibria and show that they are generically constrained inefficient. Equilibrium segregation strategies are strategies that condition actions on the type of match. It is shown that distributions of types exist such that segregation equilibrium pay-offs Pareto dominate colour-blind pay-offs. For other distributions, segregation also generates conflict, where the majority unambiguously gains, while the minority group may lose. Giving preferential treatment, that is, minority bias, can increase overall welfare. Copyright 2006, Wiley-Blackwell.