Russellian Acquaintance Revisited
Russellian Acquaintance Revisited
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重温罗素相识
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发表时间：
2014
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Ian Proops
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作者：
Ian Proops
哲学家们有时声称，在他1912年的著作《哲学的问题》(此后被引用为POP)中，可能早在1905年，罗素就认为，熟悉感觉数据为经验知识提供了一个毫无疑问的或一定的基础。1然而，尽管他在1914年的某些作品中确实说过暗示这一观点的东西，但罗素在POP中也发表了与笛卡尔对这部作品的任何解释相冲突的言论。2他说，我们对真理的所有知识都被某种程度的怀疑所感染，而忽视这一事实的理论将是明显错误的“(POP 135)。再说一次：“当然，我们的所有或任何信念都有可能是错误的，因此，所有的信念都应该至少有一些轻微的怀疑因素”(民意测验第25章)。因此，罗素对流行音乐感兴趣的背后并不是笛卡尔式的基础主义，也不是它所体现的各种区别背后的原因。这篇文章旨在通过追溯罗素在1900-1918年期间展开的(通过熟人获得的知识)和通过描述获得知识的概念的发展，来解决这个问题。特别是，我将重点讨论罗素认为的两个区别的哲学意义，这两个区别涉及(通过)相识的概念。一方面，有：
philosophers sometimes claim that in his 1912 work, The Problems of Philosophy (hereafter cited as POP), and possibly as early as “on Denoting” (1905), Russell conceives of acquaintance with sense-data as providing an indubitable or certain foundation for empirical knowledge.1 However, although he does say things suggestive of this view in certain of his 1914 works, Russell also makes remarks in POP that conflict with any Cartesian interpretation of this work.2 He says, for example, that all our knowledge of truths “is infected with some degree of doubt, and a theory which ignored this fact would be plainly wrong” (POP 135). And again: “It is of course possible that all or any of our beliefs may be mistaken, and therefore all ought to be held with at least some slight element of doubt” (POP 25). A distinctively Cartesian brand of foundationalism, then, is not what lies behind Russell’s interest in acquaintance in POP or behind the various distinctions in which it figures. But what then does?3 The present article aims to tackle this question by tracing the development of Russell’s conceptions of (knowledge by) acquaintance and knowledge by description as they unfold during the years 1900–1918. In particular, I will focus on what Russell sees as being the philosophical significance of two distinctions he draws that involve the notion of (knowledge by) acquaintance. on the one hand, there is: