Elusive Counterfactuals: Elusive Counterfactuals
Elusive Counterfactuals: Elusive Counterfactuals
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难以捉摸的反事实： 难以捉摸的反事实
DOI：
10.1111/nous.12085
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发表时间：
2016
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Karen S. Lewis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Karen S. Lewis
我为反事实怀疑论的问题提供了一个新颖的解决方案：担心所有在结果中没有明确概率的偶然反事实都是错误的。我认为，一种特定的语境主义语义学和语用学的would-和might-反事实可以阻止这两个中心路线反事实怀疑论。第一，它可以解释would-和might-反事实之间的冲突，如：（1）如果你掉了那个花瓶，它会碎的。（2）如果你把那个花瓶掉在地上，它可能已经安全地通过量子隧道到达中国。第二，它可以解释为什么像（1）这样的反事实可以为真，尽管量子隧道世界是最相似的世界之一。我进一步认为，这种品牌的语境主义占数据比其他现有的解决方案的问题。
I offer a novel solution to the problem ofcounterfactual skepticism: the worry that all contingent counterfactuals without explicit probabilities in the consequent are false. I argue that a specific kind of contextualist semantics and pragmatics for would‐ and might‐counterfactuals can block both central routes to counterfactual skepticism. One, it can explain the clash between would‐ and might‐counterfactuals as in: (1) If you had dropped that vase, it would have broken. and (2)If you had dropped that vase, it might have safely quantum tunneled to China. Two, it can explain why counterfactuals like (1) can be true despite the fact that quantum tunneling worlds are among the most similar worlds. I further argue that this brand of contextualism accounts for the data better than other existing solutions to the problem.