Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth
Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth
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DOI：
10.1257/002205105774431252
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发表时间：
2004-08
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Morck;B. Yeung;Daniel Wolfenzon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Morck;B. Yeung;Daniel Wolfenzon
在世界各地，大公司通常都有控股股东，他们通常是非常富有的家庭。在美国和英国之外，金字塔控制结构、交叉持股和超级投票权是常见的。使用这些设备，一个家族可以控制公司，而无需进行相应的资本投资。在许多国家，这些家庭最终控制了国家经济的相当大一部分。出现了三点。首先，在企业层面，这些所有权结构将主要控制权赋予了家族，而这些家族往往没有投入多少真实的资本，从而同时产生了代理和保护问题。此外，控股股东可以利用金字塔集团内部的交易转移公司资源以谋取私利。结果是资源利用率很低。在经济层面，少数家族对企业资产的广泛控制扭曲了资本配置，降低了创新率。其结果是整个经济的资源配置不当，经济增长放缓。第二，政治影响力与一个人控制什么，而不是他拥有什么有着必然的联系。因此，金字塔的控制者大大扩大了相对于他们实际财富的政治影响力。它们似乎影响着公共政策（如产权保护和执行）和资本市场等机构的发展。我们把这种现象称为经济防御。第三，我们设想公司控制权分配与制度发展之间的关系，这种关系产生并保持了一种均衡，但不是唯一的均衡。根据文献，我们确定经济防御的关键决定因素。我们还发现了许多差距，需要进一步研究公司控制权分配的政治经济重要性。
Around the world, large corporations usually have controlling owners, who are usually very wealthy families. Outside the U.S. and the U.K., pyramidal control structures, cross shareholding and super voting rights are common. Using these devices, a family can control corporations without making a commensurate capital investment. In many countries, such families end up controlling considerable proportions of their countries'' economies. Three points emerge. First, at the firm level, these ownership structures vest dominant control rights with families who often have little real capital invested creating agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for private benefits using transactions within the pyramidal group. The result is a poor utilization of resources. At the economy level, extensive control of corporate assets by a few families distorts capital allocation and reduces the rate of innovation. The result is an economy-wide misallocation of resources, and slower economic growth. Second, political influence is plausibly related to what one controls, rather than what one owns. The controlling owners of pyramids thus have greatly amplified political influence relative to their actual wealth. They appear to influence the development of both public policy, such as property rights protection and enforcement, and institutions like capital markets. We denote this phenomenon economic entrenchment. Third, we conceive of a relationship between the distribution of corporate control and institutional development that generates and preserves economic entrenchment as one equilibrium; but not the only one. Based on the literature, we identify key determinants of economic entrenchment. We also identify many gaps where further work exploring the political economy importance of the distribution of corporate control is needed.