Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
Indirect reciprocity with trinary reputations
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.10.031
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发表时间：
2013-01-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Masuda, Naoki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tanabe, Shoma;Suzuki, Hideyuki;Masuda, Naoki
间接互惠是一种基于声誉的合作机制，在社会困境的情况下，当个人不经常见面。在间接互惠的基础上进行合作的条件已经得到了非常详细的审查。大多数以前的理论分析假设数学上的易处理性，即个人拥有二元信誉值，即，好或坏，这取决于他们过去的行为和其他因素。然而，在真实的情况下，个人的声誉可能是多值的。理论和实验之间另一个令人困惑的差异是所谓的形象评分的状态，其中合作和背叛分别被判断为好和坏，与其他因素无关。这样的评价规则在行为实验中被发现，而在理论上它是不稳定的。在本研究中，我们通过分析三元声誉模型来填补这两个空白。通过穷举搜索，我们确定了所有的合作和稳定的均衡组成的同质人口或异质人口包含两种类型的球员。一些结果得出的三元信誉模型的二元模型的直接扩展。然而，我们发现，在一些温和的条件下，三进制模型允许合作下的图像评分。(C)2012爱思唯尔有限公司保留所有权利。
Indirect reciprocity is a reputation-based mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly meet. The conditions under which cooperation based on indirect reciprocity occurs have been examined in great details. Most previous theoretical analysis assumed for mathematical tractability that an individual possesses a binary reputation value, i.e., good or bad, which depends on their past actions and other factors. However, in real situations, reputations of individuals may be multiple valued. Another puzzling discrepancy between the theory and experiments is the status of the so-called image scoring, in which cooperation and defection are judged to be good and bad, respectively, independent of other factors. Such an assessment rule is found in behavioral experiments, whereas it is known to be unstable in theory. In the present study, we fill both gaps by analyzing a trinary reputation model. By an exhaustive search, we identify all the cooperative and stable equilibria composed of a homogeneous population or a heterogeneous population containing two types of players. Some results derived for the trinary reputation model are direct extensions of those for the binary model. However, we find that the trinary model allows cooperation under image scoring under some mild conditions. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.