Investment and competition in unlicensed spectrum
Investment and competition in unlicensed spectrum
复制标题
非授权频谱的投资和竞争
DOI：
10.1109/ciss.2012.6310778
复制
发表时间：
2012
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
R. Vohra
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Hang Zhou;R. Berry;M. Honig;R. Vohra
增加未授权频谱，比如美国近期开放的电视频段空白频谱，有可能通过增加竞争使消费者受益，但也可能会加剧拥堵。在之前的一篇论文中，我们利用可拥堵网络中的价格竞争模型对此进行了研究。在此，我们对该模型进行扩展，将供应商的投资成本纳入其中。考虑到这些成本，我们描述了由此产生的网络投资和定价博弈的均衡情况，并表明在某些情况下，均衡并非是竞争加剧，而是由单一垄断者进行投资。
Adding unlicensed spectrum, such as the recent opening of the television white spaces in the US, has the potential to benefit customers by increasing competition, but may also increase congestion. In an earlier paper, we studied this using models for price competition in congestible networks. Here we extend that model to include the investment costs of providers. With such costs, we characterize the equilibria of the resulting network investment and pricing game and show that in some cases the equilibrium is not increased competition but rather investment by a single monopolist.