Political Careers Or Career Politicians? Second Version
Political Careers Or Career Politicians? Second Version
复制标题
政治生涯还是职业政治家？
DOI：
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复制
发表时间：
2005
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Antonio Merlo
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
A. Mattozzi;Antonio Merlo
在现代民主国家的政治家中，有两种主要的职业道路：职业政治家（即，在政治部门工作直到退休的政治家），和政治生涯（即，有些政治家在退休前离开政界，在私营部门工作）。在本文中，我们提出了一个动态均衡模型的职业生涯的政治家在一个环境中的私营部门和政治部门，其中个人是异质性的，就他们的市场能力和政治技能。我们的分析为职业政治家和有政治生涯的个人的存在及其动机提供了解释。我们还研究了货币激励和政治经济环境的其他特征对政治家及其职业生涯质量的影响。我们发现，增加工资的政治家收到，而在办公室降低个人成为政治家的平均质量，减少营业额在办公室，并可能会减少或增加职业政治家的平均质量。
Two main career paths are prevalent among politicians in modern democracies: there are career politicians (i.e., politicians who work in the political sector until retirement), and political careers (i.e., there are politicians who leave politics before retirement and work in the private sector). In this paper, we propose a dynamic equilibrium model of the careers of politicians in an environment with a private sector and a political sector, where individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their market ability and political skills. Our analysis provides an explanation for the existence of career politicians and individuals with political careers, and their motivations. We also investigate the effects of monetary incentives and other features of the political-economic environment on the quality of politicians and their careers. We show that an increase in the salary a politician receives while in office decreases the average quality of individuals who become politicians, decreases turnover in office, and may either decrease or increase the average quality of career politicians.