The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions
The outbreak of cooperation among success-driven individuals under noisy conditions
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DOI：
10.1073/pnas.0811503106
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发表时间：
2009-03-10
影响因子：
11.1
通讯作者：
Yu, Wenjian
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Helbing, Dirk;Yu, Wenjian
根据托马斯·霍布斯的《利维坦》[1651；2008年（试金石出版社，纽约），英文版)，“人的一生是孤独的、贫穷的、肮脏的、粗野的、短暂的”，它需要强大的社会机构来建立社会秩序。然而，在现实中，社会合作也可以自发产生，基于局部互动而不是集中控制。合作行为的自组织在与共享自然资源或创造共同产品有关的社会困境中尤其令人困惑。这种情况通常被描述为囚徒困境。在这里，我们报告了在一个由自私和背叛主导的嘈杂世界中，当个体模仿优越策略并表现出成功驱动的迁移时，优势合作的突然爆发。在我们的模型中，个体是不相关的，不继承行为特征。当机会出现时，他们要么背叛，要么自私地合作，他们不知道自己将与他人互动或已经与他人互动的频率。此外，我们的个体没有声誉机制来形成友谊网络，他们也没有自愿互动或代价高昂的惩罚的选择。因此，当定向运动被整合到博弈论模型中时，普遍合作的爆发是值得注意的，特别是当随机策略突变和随机重新定位挑战合作集群的形成和生存时。研究结果表明，人口流动对社会秩序的演变具有重要意义，对社会秩序的稳定和维持至关重要。
According to Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan [1651; 2008 (Touchstone, New York), English Ed], "the life of man [is] solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short,'' and it would need powerful social institutions to establish social order. In reality, however, social cooperation can also arise spontaneously, based on local interactions rather than centralized control. The self-organization of cooperative behavior is particularly puzzling for social dilemmas related to sharing natural resources or creating common goods. Such situations are often described by the prisoner's dilemma. Here, we report the sudden outbreak of predominant cooperation in a noisy world dominated by selfishness and defection, when individuals imitate superior strategies and show success-driven migration. In our model, individuals are unrelated, and do not inherit behavioral traits. They defect or cooperate selfishly when the opportunity arises, and they do not know how often they will interact or have interacted with someone else. Moreover, our individuals have no reputation mechanism to form friendship networks, nor do they have the option of voluntary interaction or costly punishment. Therefore, the outbreak of prevailing cooperation, when directed motion is integrated in a game-theoretical model, is remarkable, particularly when random strategy mutations and random relocations challenge the formation and survival of cooperative clusters. Our results suggest that mobility is significant for the evolution of social order, and essential for its stabilization and maintenance.