The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining
The Role of Negotiators in Union-Firm Bargaining
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谈判者在工会与企业谈判中的作用
DOI：
10.2307/135545
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发表时间：
1989
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
S. Jones
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
S. Jones
工会领导人的目标与普通员工的目标之间的差异传统上被认为是政治过程或非理性的结果。本文表明，这种差异将自然出现的一部分，一个合理的谈判策略，因为授权给谈判者允许工会成员实现有利的承诺。谈判者的这种使用导致了对许多流行的工资和就业决定理论的修正解释，如有效讨价还价和管理权模型，并对工会行为的计量经济学模型的解释产生了影响。
Differences between the objectives of union leaders and those of the rank and file have traditionally been thought the result of political processes or irrationality. This paper shows that such differences will naturally arise as part of a rational bargaining strategy, since delegation of authority to a negotiator permits the union members to achieve advantageous commitment. This use of negotiators leads to revised interpretation of many popular theories of wage and employment determination, such as the efficient bargain and the right-to-manage models, and has implications for the interpretation of econometric modeling of union behavior.