CREATING EXPECTATIONAL ASSETS IN THE LABORATORY - COORDINATION IN WEAKEST-LINK GAMES
CREATING EXPECTATIONAL ASSETS IN THE LABORATORY - COORDINATION IN WEAKEST-LINK GAMES
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DOI：
10.1002/smj.4250150908
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发表时间：
1994-12-01
影响因子：
8.3
通讯作者：
CAMERER, C
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
KNEZ, M;CAMERER, C
我们研究具有多重均衡的协调博弈，在这种博弈中，参与者如果选择的数字高于任何人选择的最小值，就会受到惩罚，并且每个人都喜欢更大的最小值。像这样的“薄弱环节”游戏模拟了一种组织情况，在这种情况下，产品或流程中最差的部分决定了其整体质量。在实验组中，很少达到最佳平衡。把两个群体聚集成一个更大的群体总是很痛苦。我们认为，球员的信念，什么是最低限度将是一个“预期资产”（或负债），这是社会复杂的，连接组织层面的行为和资源为基础的公司的看法。
We study coordination games with multiple equilibria, in which players are penalized for picking numbers higher than the minimum anybody picks, and everyone prefers a larger minimum. 'Weakest-link' games like this model organizational situations in which the worst component of a product or process determines its overall quality. In experimental groups, the best equilibrium was reached infrequently. Aggregating two groups into a larger one always hurt. We argue that players' beliefs about what the minimum will be are an 'expectational asset' (or liability) which is socially complex, linking organization-level behavior and the resource-based view of the firm.