Liquidity in Credit Networks with Constrained Agents
Liquidity in Credit Networks with Constrained Agents
复制标题
代理受限的信用网络的流动性
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
David Mazières
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Geoffrey Ramseyer;Ashish Goel;David Mazières
为了扩大在全球网络上部署的交易率，许多加密货币都部署了所谓的“第2层”私人支付渠道网络。一个理想化的支付网络的行为就像一个信用网络，一个在双边信任关系网络上进行交易的模型。信用网络涵盖了传统货币以及新的虚拟货币和支付机制的许多方面。在传统的信用网络模型中，如果一个代理违约，其他信任它的节点都很容易受到损失。在加密货币的背景下，信任是由资本存款产生的，因此在网络流动性（即成功交易的比例）和资本存款成本之间存在自然的权衡。在本文中，我们引入的限制，约束的总金额的损失，其余的网络可以遭受，如果一个代理（或一组代理）是默认的-等价的，如何网络的变化，如果代理可以支持有限的偿付能力保证。我们表明，这些约束保持了信用网络的分析结构。此外，我们表明，总借款约束大大简化了网络结构，并在支付网络的背景下，实现流动性和托管资本量之间的最佳权衡。
In order to scale transaction rates for deployment across the global web, many cryptocurrencies have deployed so-called ”Layer-2” networks of private payment channels. An idealized payment network behaves like a Credit Network, a model for transactions across a network of bilateral trust relationships. Credit Networks capture many aspects of traditional currencies as well as new virtual currencies and payment mechanisms. In the traditional credit network model, if an agent defaults, every other node that trusted it is vulnerable to loss. In a cryptocurrency context, trust is manufactured by capital deposits, and thus there arises a natural tradeoff between network liquidity (i.e. the fraction of transactions that succeed) and the cost of capital deposits. In this paper, we introduce constraints that bound the total amount of loss that the rest of the network can suffer if an agent (or a set of agents) were to default - equivalently, how the network changes if agents can support limited solvency guarantees. We show that these constraints preserve the analytical structure of a credit network. Furthermore, we show that aggregate borrowing constraints greatly simplify the network structure and in the payment network context achieve the optimal tradeoff between liquidity and amount of escrowed capital.