Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets
Mixed Signals: IMF Lending and Capital Markets
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混合信号：国际货币基金组织贷款和资本市场
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
5
通讯作者：
R. Stone
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Terrence L. Chapman;Songying Fang;Xin Li;R. Stone
国际货币基金组织（基金组织）新的贷款公告对资本市场的影响取决于贷款人的政治动机。在某些条件下，贷款可以降低危机深化的风险，并降低市场行为者要求的风险溢价。然而，使贷款人愿意贷款的政治利益可能会削弱改革承诺的可信度，而接受协议的行为也会透露出有关借款人经济状况的不利信息。对私人借贷价格的净“催化”效应取决于这些效应是否主导了贷款提供的流动性的有益效应。分解危机贷款的矛盾影响提供了一个解释的不一致的实证研究结果在文献中的市场反应。本研究通过考察主权债券收益率如何受到IMF计划公告、贷款规模、贷款附加条件的范围以及美国（IMF主要成员国）地缘政治利益的衡量标准的影响，来检验该理论的含义。
The effect of new International Monetary Fund (IMF) lending announcements on capital markets depends on the lender’s political motivations. There are conditions under which lending reduces the risk of a deepening crisis and the risk premium demanded by market actors. Yet the political interests that make lenders willing to lend may weaken the credibility of commitments to reform, and the act of accepting an agreement reveals unfavorable information about the state of the borrower’s economy. The net ‘catalytic’ effect on the price of private borrowing depends on whether these effects dominate the beneficial effects of the liquidity the loan provides. Decomposing the contradictory effects of crisis lending provides an explanation for the discrepant empirical findings in the literature about market reactions. This study tests the implications of the theory by examining how sovereign bond yields are affected by IMF program announcements, loan size, the scope of conditions attached to loans and measures of the geopolitical interests of the United States, a key IMF principal.