Mimicry Attacks Against Wireless Link Signature and New Defense Using Time-Synched Link Signature
Mimicry Attacks Against Wireless Link Signature and New Defense Using Time-Synched Link Signature
复制标题
DOI：
10.1109/tifs.2016.2541307
复制
发表时间：
2016-07
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
Song Fang;Yao Liu;P. Ning
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Song Fang;Yao Liu;P. Ning
无线链路签名是一种物理层认证机制，利用发送器和接收器之间的多径效应来提供无线信号的认证。本文针对现有的无线链路签名方案确定了一种称为模仿攻击的新攻击。只要攻击者知道接收器位置处的合法信号，攻击者就可以伪造合法发送器的链路签名，并且攻击者不必与合法发送器处于完全相同的位置。我们还将拟态攻击扩展到多输入多输出（MIMO）系统，并得出结论：只有当攻击者的天线数量等于或大于接收器天线的数量时，拟态攻击才可行。为了防御模仿攻击，本文通过将密码保护和时间因素集成到无线物理层特征中，提出了一种新颖的无线链路签名结构，称为时间同步链路签名。实验结果证实模仿攻击是一种真正的威胁，并且新提出的时间同步链路签名在物理层身份验证中是有效的。
Wireless link signature is a physical layer authentication mechanism, using the multipath effect between a transmitter and a receiver to provide authentication of wireless signals. This paper identifies a new attack, called mimicry attack, against the existing wireless link signature schemes. An attacker can forge a legitimate transmitter's link signature as long as it knows the legitimate signal at the receiver's location, and the attacker does not have to be at exactly the same location as the legitimate transmitter. We also extend the mimicry attack to multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems, and conclude that the mimicry attack is feasible only when the number of attacker' antennas is equal to or larger than that of the receiver's antennas. To defend against the mimicry attack, this paper proposes a novel construction for wireless link signature, called time-synched link signature, by integrating cryptographic protection and time factor into wireless physical layer features. Experimental results confirm that the mimicry attack is a real threat and the newly proposed time-synched link signatures are effective in physical layer authentication.