Inequality and Education Choice
Inequality and Education Choice
复制标题
不平等与教育选择
DOI：
10.1007/s10797-019-09584-3
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yuki Uchida;Tetsuo Ono
本研究提出了一个具有人力资本积累和选择退出公共教育的两级继承人模型。该模型论证了不平等与教育选择之间的相互作用，并表明这种相互作用导致了两个局部稳定的稳态均衡。多重稳定均衡的存在意味着不平等与公共教育入学人数之间存在负相关，这与经济合作与发展组织(OECD)国家的证据一致。这项研究还利用经济合作与发展组织国家的数据进行了福利分析，并表明，引入强制性公共教育制度会让第一代人的境况变得更糟，尽管它实现了平等的社会，并改善了未来几代下层阶级个人的福利。
This study presents a two-class successive generations model with human capital accumulation and the choice to opt out of public education. The model demonstrates the mutual interaction between inequality and education choice and shows that this interaction leads to two locally stable steady-state equilibria. The existence of multiple stable equilibria implies a negative association between inequality and public education enrollment, which is consistent with evidence from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries. This study also presents a welfare analysis using data from OECD countries and shows that introducing a compulsory public education system leaves the first generation worse off, although it realizes an equal society and improves welfare for future generations of lower-class individuals.