Strongly Secure Certificateless Public Key Encryption Without Pairing
Strongly Secure Certificateless Public Key Encryption Without Pairing
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DOI：
10.1007/978-3-540-76969-9_13
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发表时间：
2007-12
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Yinxia Sun;Futai Zhang;J. Baek
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yinxia Sun;Futai Zhang;J. Baek
无证书公钥加密技术 (CLPKC) 享有基于 ID 的公钥加密技术的优势，且不会遇到密钥托管问题。 2005 年，Baek 等人。提出了第一个不依赖于配对的无证书加密（CLPKE）方案。虽然它提供了高效率，但他们的方案的一个缺点是安全证明仅适用于较弱的安全模型，其中不允许类型 I 对手替换与挑战身份关联的公钥。在本文中，我们消除了这一限制，构建了一个无需配对的强安全 CLPKE 方案。我们证明，只要计算 Diffie-Hellman 问题难以解决，所提出的方案就可以安全地抵御随机预言模型中的自适应选择密文攻击。
Certificateless Public Key Cryptography(CLPKC) enjoys the advantage of ID-based public key cryptography without suffering from the key escrow problem. In 2005, Baek et al. proposed the first certificateless encryption (CLPKE) scheme that does not depend on pairing. Although it provides high efficiency, one drawback of their scheme is that the security proof only holds for a weaker security model in which the Type I adversary is not allowed to replace the public key associated with the challenge identity. In this paper, we eliminate this limitation and construct a strongly secure CLPKE scheme without pairing. We prove that the proposed scheme is secure against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack in the random oracle model, provided that the Computational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable.