Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent
Achieving compliance when legal sanctions are non-deterrent
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DOI：
10.1111/j.1467-9442.2006.00444.x
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发表时间：
2006-01-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Feld, LP
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Tyran, JR;Feld, LP
以非威慑性制裁为后盾的法律（温和法律）被假设为由于规范激活而实现合规。我们通过将温和法律与严厉法律（威慑性制裁）和没有法律进行比较，实验研究了温和法律在提供公共产品方面的效果。结果表明，外部施加温和法律不能达到合规，但如果内部选择温和法律，即自我施加温和法律，则会大大提高合规。我们表明，投票支持温和的法律会引发合作的期望，如果人们期望许多其他人也遵守法律，他们就倾向于遵守法律。
Law backed by non-deterrent sanctions (mild law) has been hypothesized to achieve compliance because of norm activation. We experimentally investigate the effects of mild law in the provision of public goods by comparing it to severe law (deterrent sanctions) and no law. The results show that exogenously imposing mild law does not achieve compliance, but compliance is much improved if mild law is endogenously chosen, i.e., self-imposed. We show that voting for mild law induces expectations of cooperation, and that people tend to comply with the law if they expect many others to do so.