The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions
The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions
复制标题
司法等级制度：测试最高法院与巡回法院互动的委托代理模型
DOI：
--
复制
发表时间：
1994
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Cameron
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Donald R. Songer;J. Segal;C. Cameron
我们从委托代理的角度研究最高法院巡回法院的互动，采用事实模式分析，以确定巡回法院遵循自己的政策偏好的程度与他们遵循最高法院的政策规定的程度。然后，我们研究最高法院的监督是否会影响这些互动。我们发现，上诉法院对最高法院不断变化的搜查和扣押政策反应迅速。然而，法官意识形态的强大独立影响证明，法官确实有机会“逃避”，以满足自己的政策利益。我们还发现有力的证据表明，诉讼当事人在影响最高法院的监督方面发挥着积极作用。
We examine Supreme Court-circuit court interactions from a principal-agent perspective, employing a fact pattern analysis to determine the extent to which circuit courts follow their own policy preferences versus the extent that they follow the policy dictates of the Supreme Court. We then examine whether monitoring by the Supreme Court can affect those interactions. We find that the courts of appeals are highly responsive to the changing search and seizure policies of the Supreme Court. Nevertheless, the strong independent effect of the ideologies of the judges gives evidence that judges do find opportunities to "shirk" to satisfy their own policy interests. We also find strong evidence that litigants play an active role in influencing monitoring by the Supreme Court.