Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets
Product Quality Signaling in Experimental Markets
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实验市场中的产品质量信号
作者：
Ross M. Miller;C. Plott
在一系列的11个市场中，卖家拥有的产品都是外来指定的
等级为“普通”或等级为“超级”。超级跑车更受买家重视，但档次更高
买家在购买前不能观察到。卖家可以增加昂贵的质量单位
他们的产品是买家可以观察到的和有价值的。对数据进行了统计分析
完全信息模型、信号均衡模型和汇集模型。品种繁多
在11个市场上观察到了大量的行为。大多数市场都观察到了信号传递
随着一些市场接近最有效的信号均衡。池化或部分
在一些市场上也出现了拼车现象。性能似乎对相对成本很敏感
信号和市场制度设置。
In a series of eleven markets, sellers possessed products that were exogenously designated
as either grade "regular" or grade "super." Supers were valued more by buyers but grade
could not be observed by buyers prior to purchase. Sellers could add costly units of quality
to their products that were observable and valued by buyers. The data are analyzed with
perfect information models, signaling equilibrium models, and pooling models. A variety
of behaviors are observed across the eleven markets. Signaling is observed in most markets
with some markets approaching the most efficient signaling equilibrium. Pooling or partial
pooling occurs in a few markets. The performance seems to be sensitive to the relative cost
of signaling and the market institutional setting.