Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan
Zombie Lending and Depressed Restructuring in Japan
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日本的僵尸贷款和萧条重组
DOI：
10.1257/aer.98.5.1943
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发表时间：
2008-12-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Kashyap, Anil K.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Caballero, Ricardo J.;Hoshi, Takeo;Kashyap, Anil K.
日本的大型银行经常进行虚假的贷款重组，使信贷流向其他资不抵债的借款人（我们称之为僵尸）。我们研究了抑制正常竞争过程的影响，僵尸企业会因此裁员并失去市场份额。僵尸企业造成的拥堵减少了健康企业的利润，从而阻碍了它们的进入和投资。我们证实，以企业为主导的行业表现出更压抑的就业创造和破坏，生产率较低。我们提出的企业层面的回归表明，僵尸企业的增加抑制了非僵尸企业的投资和就业增长，扩大了僵尸企业和非僵尸企业之间的生产率差距。
Large Japanese banks often engaged in sham loan restructurings that kept credit flowing to otherwise insolvent borrowers (which we call zombies). We examine the implications of suppressing the normal competitive process whereby the zombies would shed workers and lose market share. The congestion created by the zombies reduces the profits for healthy firms, which discourages their entry and investment. We confirm that zombie-dominated industries exhibit more depressed job creation and destruction, and lower productivity. We present firm-level regressions showing that the increase in zombies depressed the investment and employment growth of non-zombies and widened the productivity gap between zombies and non-zombies.