EXECUTIVE PAY AND THE DISCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT: CANADIAN EVIDENCE
EXECUTIVE PAY AND THE DISCLOSURE ENVIRONMENT: CANADIAN EVIDENCE
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高管薪酬和披露环境：加拿大的证据
DOI：
10.1111/j.1475-6803.2001.tb00774.x
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发表时间：
2001
影响因子：
3.5
通讯作者：
M. Huson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Yun W. Park;T. Nelson;M. Huson
我们研究了安大略证券委员会要求公司在委托书中披露高管薪酬细节的经济后果。1993年以前，加拿大公司只报告高管薪酬总额。我们预测，薪酬信息的增加将迫使董事会通过提供更高的薪酬在管理劳动力市场上竞争。我们还预计，公众对董事会施加压力，要求其证明高管薪酬水平的合理性，将导致激励性薪酬的权重增加。数据支持这些假设。我们还记录了薪酬-绩效敏感性的增加。
We examine the economic consequences of the Ontario Securities Commission's requirement that firms disclose details of executive pay in proxy statements. Before 1993, Canadian firms only reported executive compensation in the aggregate. We predict the increased availability of compensation information will force boards of directors to compete in the managerial labor market by offering higher pay. We also predict public pressure on boards of directors to justify the level of executive pay will result in increased weight on incentive pay. The data support these hypotheses. We also document that pay-performance sensitivity has increased.