Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?
Heterogeneous multiple bank financing: does it reduce inefficient credit-renegotiation incidences?
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异构多家银行融资：它是否减少了低效的信贷重新谈判发生率？
DOI：
10.1007/s11408-007-0062-6
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发表时间：
2007
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Bannier
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Bannier
中小企业往往通过关系和正常银行贷款的混合方式获得资本。我们发现，这种异质性的多银行融资导致低效率的信用止赎的概率比垄断关系贷款和同质性的多银行融资。然而，为了减少拖延和协调失败的风险，关系银行的总公司债务的比例不能变得太大。对于具有中间预期利润的企业，随着关系银行信息精度的提高，企业发生无效率信用再谈判的概率沿着降低。然而，对于预期收益极高或极低的公司，它会增加。
Small and medium-sized firms often obtain capital via a mixture of relationship and arm’s-length bank lending. We show that such heterogeneous multiple bank financing leads to a lower probability of inefficient credit foreclosure than both monopoly relationship lending and homogeneous multiple bank financing. Yet, in order to reduce hold-up and coordination-failure risk, the relationship bank’s fraction of total firm debt must not become too large. For firms with intermediate expected profits, the probability of inefficient credit-renegotiation is shown to decrease along with the relationship bank’s information precision. For firms with extremely high or extremely low expected returns, however, it increases.