Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring in the Japanese Main Bank System
Reciprocal Delegated Monitoring in the Japanese Main Bank System
复制标题
日本主要银行系统中的相互委托监控
DOI：
10.1006/jjie.1994.1001
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发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
2.9
通讯作者：
P. Sheard
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
P. Sheard
摘要本文将日本主要银行体系描述为一种促进一系列银行之间相互委托监督的安排。相互委托监督允许银行和公司保持多元化，同时确保监督的进行没有重复，但当监督不可观察时，它会导致非主要银行和主要银行之间的委托代理关系。主要银行承担不成比例的大部分银行损失的惯例被视为银行间合同安排的一部分，旨在给予主要银行足够的激励，以代表整个放贷银行进行监督。日本j。Int。经济学。， 1994年3月，8(1)，页1 - 21。大阪大学经济系，丰中，大阪560
Abstract This paper characterizes the Japanese main bank system as an arrangement for facilitating reciprocal delegation of monitoring among a set of banks. Reciprocal delegated monitoring allows banks and firms to remain diversified while ensuring that monitoring takes place without duplication, but when monitoring is unobservable, it induces a principal-agent relationship between non-main banks and the main bank. The convention that the main bank bears a disproportionately large share of bank losses is viewed as being part of a contractual arrangement among banks designed to give the main bank adequate incentives to carry out monitoring on behalf of lending banks as a whole. J. Japan. Int. Econ., March 1994, 8 (1), pp. 1–21. Faculty of Economics, Osaka University, Toyonaka, Osaka 560, Japan.