COVENANTS WITH AND WITHOUT A SWORD - SELF-GOVERNANCE IS POSSIBLE
COVENANTS WITH AND WITHOUT A SWORD - SELF-GOVERNANCE IS POSSIBLE
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DOI：
10.2307/1964229
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发表时间：
1992-06-01
影响因子：
6.8
通讯作者：
GARDNER, R
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
OSTROM, E;WALKER, J;GARDNER, R
当代政治理论常常假定，在存在着破坏承诺的巨大诱惑的情况下，个人无法做出可信的承诺，除非这种承诺是由外部代理人强制执行的。这种情况可能发生在公共资源方面，这些资源是自然或人为资源，其产量可减，排除这些资源并非微不足道（但不一定不可能）。例子包括渔业、森林、牧场、灌溉系统和地下水盆地。然而，经验证据表明，在许多情况下，共同资源的拨款人在不依赖外部当局的情况下作出可信的承诺。我们展示了一系列实验的结果，这些实验探索了(1)单独的契约（包括一次性和重复的沟通机会）；(2)单剑（反复有机会互相制裁）；(3)契约与内部剑相结合（一次性沟通，然后是反复相互制裁的机会）。
Contemporary political theory often assumes that individuals cannot make credible commitments where substantial temptations exist to break them unless such commitments are enforced by an external agent. One such situation may occur in relation to common pool resources, which are natural or man-made resources whose yield is subtractable and whose exclusion is nontrivial (but not necessarily impossible). Examples include fisheries, forests, grazing ranges, irrigation systems, and groundwater basins. Empirical evidence, however, suggests that appropriators in common pool resources develop credible commitments in many cases without relying on external authorities. We present findings from a series of experiments exploring (1) covenants alone (both one-shot and repeated communication opportunities); (2) swords alone (repeated opportunities to sanction each other); and (3) covenants combined with an internal sword (one-shot communication followed by repeated opportunities to sanction each other).