A Trust-Driven Contract Incentive Scheme for Mobile Crowd-Sensing Networks

A Trust-Driven Contract Incentive Scheme for Mobile Crowd-Sensing Networks
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移动群智感知网络的信任驱动合约激励方案

DOI:
10.1109/tvt.2021.3117696
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发表时间:
2022-02-01
影响因子:
6.8
通讯作者:
Lu, Ning
Lu, Ning
中科院分区:
计算机科学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
Dai, Minghui;Su, Zhou;Lu, Ning

文献摘要

被引文献

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通过利用人群的力量,移动的设备在移动的人群感知(MCS)网络中的普及通过收集和共享感知数据来帮助和提供广泛的感知服务。然而,由于移动的用户行为的多样性,不可靠或恶意的用户和平台可能会提供不可信的数据,影响感知服务的质量。此外,移动的用户不愿意参与感测任务没有足够的激励。为了提高MCS的服务效率,需要设计一种信任和激励机制。本文提出了一种新的信任驱动的合同激励框架,在MCS,保证服务质量和刺激移动的用户加入传感任务。我们首先设计了一个基于历史交互的移动的用户与传感平台之间的信任评估方案,得出传感平台的可靠性值。然后,信任阈值的制定过滤出恶意的传感平台。通过考虑移动的用户的隐私偏好,我们建立了一个合同激励机制,以最大限度地提高移动的用户和传感平台的效用。设计目标是在离散和连续两种契约模型下得到一组最优契约。同时,所设计的契约保证了个体的理性和激励相容性。最后,通过仿真验证了所提出的信任驱动契约激励方案的有效性,结果表明,该方案能够联合提高感知服务质量,最大化移动的用户和感知平台的效用.
By leveraging the power of crowd, the prevalence of mobile devices in mobile crowd-sensing (MCS) networks helps and provides a wide range of sensing services through collecting and sharing sensing data. However, due to the diverse behaviours of mobile users, unreliable or malicious users and platforms could provide untrusted data, which affects the quality of sensing service. Besides, mobile users are reluctant to participate in sensing tasks without sufficient incentives. It is desirable to design a trust and incentive scheme to improve the service efficiency of MCS. In this paper, we propose a novel trust-driven contract incentive framework in MCS, which guarantees the service quality and stimulates mobile users to join sensing tasks. We first design a trust evaluation scheme between mobile users and sensing platforms based on the historical interactions to derive the reliability value of sensing platform. Then, the trust threshold is formulated to filter out malicious sensing platforms. By considering the privacy preferences of mobile users, we establish a contract incentive scheme to maximize the utility of both mobile users and sensing platforms. The design objective is to derive a set of optimal contracts under both discrete and continuous contract models. Meanwhile, the designed contracts guarantee the individual rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) properties. Finally, simulations are conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed trust-driven contract incentive scheme, and results demonstrate that the proposed scheme can jointly improve the quality of sensing service and maximize the utilities of mobile users and sensing platforms.