ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
ENDOGENOUS ELECTION TIMING IN MAJORITARIAN PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEMS
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多数派议会系统的内生选举时机
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-0343.1996.tb00123.x
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发表时间：
1996
影响因子：
1
通讯作者：
Alastair Smith
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Alastair Smith
在许多议会制度中，选举日期是内生选择。本文探讨了政府何时举行选举以及选举的时间如何影响选举结果。政府有机会主义行为的动机，在表现良好时举行选举。然而，选举日期的选择揭示了有关政府的信息。具体来说，提前选举表明政府对其未来表现良好的能力缺乏信心。分析范围扩大到考虑政府组成的变化、政治商业周期、信息不对称和反对派竞选的作用。
The election date is an endogenous choice in many parliamentary systems. This paper explores when governments call elections and how the timing of an election influences the electoral result. Governments have an incentive to behave opportunistically, calling elections at a time when they are performing well. However, the choice of election date reveals information about the government. Specifically, early elections indicate that a government has little faith in its ability to perform well in the future. The analysis is expanded to consider changes in government composition, political business cycles, informational asymmetries and the role of opposition campaigning.