Retirement and Social Security : The Roles of Self-fulfilling Expectations and Educational Investments
Retirement and Social Security : The Roles of Self-fulfilling Expectations and Educational Investments
复制标题
退休和社会保障:自我实现期望和教育投资的作用
DOI：
10.1007/s10101-011-0099-x
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发表时间：
2011
影响因子：
0.9
通讯作者：
Tetsuo Ono
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Ryo Arawatari;Tetsuo Ono
对继续工作征收较高隐性税的国家，老年人的劳动力参与率较低。本文构建了一个政治经济模型，占这一特点的基础上，多个，自我实现的期望代理。在这个模型中，代理人在出生时是相同的，可以通过教育投资变得熟练（或保持不熟练）。当代理人持有更大的社会保障福利的期望时，它提供了对教育投资的抑制，从而导致大多数人没有技能。反过来，这一无技能的多数支持更大的社会保障福利，这导致老年人退休，从而导致劳动力参与率降低。当代理人对老年社会保障福利的期望较小时，情况正好相反。
Countries with higher implicit taxes on continued work are associated with lower labor force participation rates of the elderly. This paper constructs a politico-economic model that accounts for this feature based on multiple, self-fulfilling expectations of agents. In this model, agents are identical at birth and can become skilled (or remain unskilled) through educational investment. When agents hold expectations of larger social security benefits, it provides a disincentive to engage in educational investment, thereby resulting in an unskilled majority. In turn, this unskilled majority supports larger social security benefits, which induces the retirement of the elderly and thus results in a lower labor force participation rate. The opposite applies when agents have expectations of smaller social security benefits in their old age.