No Need for Alarm: A Critical Analysis of Greene’s Dual-Process Theory of Moral Decision-Making
No Need for Alarm: A Critical Analysis of Greene’s Dual-Process Theory of Moral Decision-Making
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无需警报：对格林道德决策双过程理论的批判性分析
DOI：
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发表时间：
2014
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
R. Bluhm
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
R. Bluhm
约书亚Greene）和他的同事提出了道德决策的双过程理论，以解释情绪反应对我们对道德困境的判断的影响，这些道德困境要求我们考虑造成直接的个人伤害。该理论的早期表述将情感决策和认知决策进行了对比，认为每一种决策都是可分离的神经系统的产物。后来的公式强调，情绪也参与认知过程。我认为，鉴于承认情绪告知认知决策，一个单一的过程理论可以解释所有的数据，已被引用作为格林的理论的证据。对造成伤害的想法的情绪反应可能在程度上有所不同，但在种类上与影响道德决策的其他情绪不同。
Joshua Greene and his colleagues have proposed a dual-process theory of moral decision-making to account for the effects of emotional responses on our judgments about moral dilemmas that ask us to contemplate causing direct personal harm. Early formulations of the theory contrast emotional and cognitive decision-making, saying that each is the product of a separable neural system. Later formulations emphasize that emotions are also involved in cognitive processing. I argue that, given the acknowledgement that emotions inform cognitive decision-making, a single-process theory can explain all of the data that have been cited as evidence for Greene’s theory. The emotional response to the thought of causing harm may differ in degree, but not in kind, from other emotions influencing moral decision-making.