India’s States: The Struggle to Govern

India’s States: The Struggle to Govern
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印度各邦:治理斗争

DOI:
10.1177/2321023016634909
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发表时间:
2016
影响因子:
0.5
通讯作者:
J. Manor
J. Manor
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
J. Manor

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本文分析了印度不同邦的治理策略的最新变化。这些差异意味着“印度国家”,正如公民所经历的那样,在不同的邦采取不同的形式。 1989年至2014年中期,没有任何一个政党能够获得议会多数席位。这导致权力从曾经占主导地位的总理办公室大幅下放——横向到国家层面的其他机构,纵向向下到州层面的政府。具有讽刺意味的是,在国家层面权力下放的同时,权力也明显集中在许多邦的首席部长手中。这与 2003 年之后邦和中央政府收入的激增有关,也与印度远非新自由主义的经济秩序有关,后者让政客掌握了巨大的自由裁量权。首席部长用来增加影响力和维持权力的各种手段(合法的和非法的)都受到了审查。
This article analyzes recent variations in governing strategies in different Indian states. Those variations mean that the ‘Indian state’, as citizens experience it, takes different forms in different states. Between 1989 and mid-2014, no single party could gain a parliamentary majority. That caused a major decentralization of power away from the once dominant Prime Minister’s Office—horizontally to other institutions at the national level, and vertically downward to governments at the state level. Ironically, that decentralization of power at the national level was accompanied by a marked centralization of power in the hands of chief ministers within many states. This is connected to a surge in state and central government revenues after 2003, and to India’s far from neoliberal economic order which leaves huge discretionary power in politicians’ hands. Various devices—legitimate and illicit—which chief ministers use to increase their influence and to survive in power are examined.