Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s
Fiscal Federalism and Regional Growth: Evidence from the Russian Federation in the 1990s
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财政联邦制与区域增长：来自 20 世纪 90 年代俄罗斯联邦的证据
DOI：
10.1596/1813-9450-3138
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发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Itzhak Goldberg
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Raj M. Desai;L. Freinkman;Itzhak Goldberg
地方财政自治——现代联邦财政联邦制的基础——有两个作用。首先，地方对税收征收的控制旨在检查中央当局任意向地方资本征税的能力。其次，保留地方征收的税收旨在激励地方政府当局促进地方性经济增长，以此作为促进地方税基的一种方式。但在俄罗斯联邦，财政自治地区往往抵制市场导向的改革、保护私有财产的规则的制定以及价格管制和贸易壁垒的拆除。作者找到了支持俄罗斯地区财政激励是地区经济表现的重要决定因素这一假设的统计证据。作者还试图了解财政自治在什么条件下促进地区增长和复苏，以及在什么条件下产生不利的经济影响。他们认为，“不劳而获”收入流的存在——特别是来自自然资源生产或来自中央政府预算转移的收入——已经将依赖这些收入来源的地区变成了“食利者”地区。因此，这些地区的政府利用地方对收入和支出的控制来保护某些企业（自然资源生产商或亏损企业）免受市场力量的影响。作者利用 1996-99 年俄罗斯 80 个地区的新财政数据，在单方程和联立方程规范中检验了这一中心假设。他们的结果表明，自苏联解体以来，税收保留（作为财政自主权的代表）对地区累计产出恢复具有积极影响。但他们也发现，随着地区可出租收入的增加，这种影响会减弱。
Subnational fiscal autonomy-the basis for fiscal federalism in modern federations-is meant to serve two roles. First, local control over revenue collection is meantto provide a check on the capacity of central authorities to tax arbitrarily local capital. Second, retention of taxes raised locally is meant to establish incentives for subnational governmental authorities to foster endemic economic growth as a way of promoting local tax bases. But in the Russian Federation, fiscally autonomous regions have often resisted market-oriented reforms, the enactment of rules protecting private property, and the dismantling of price controls and barriers to trade. The authors find statistical evidence in support of the hypothesis that fiscal incentives of the Russian regions represent an important determinant of regional economic performance. The authors also seek to understand the conditions under which fiscal autonomy prompts regional growth and recovery, and the conditions under which it has adverse economic effects. They argue that the presence of"unearned"income streams-particularly in the form of revenues from natural resource production or from budgetary transfers from the central government-has turned regions dependent on these income sources into"rentier"regions. As such, governments in these regions have used local control over revenues and expenditures to shelter certain firms (natural resource producers or loss-making enterprises) from market forces. Using new fiscal data from 80 Russian regions from 1996-99, the authors test this central hypothesis in both single- and simultaneous-equation specifications. Their results indicate that tax retention (as a proxy for fiscal autonomy) has a positive effect on the cumulative output recovery of regions since the breakup of the Soviet Union. But they also find that this effect decreases as rentable income streams to regions increase.