The Internal Economics of a University: Evidence from Personnel Data
The Internal Economics of a University: Evidence from Personnel Data
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DOI：
10.1086/664946
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发表时间：
2012-07
影响因子：
3.8
通讯作者：
C. Haeck;F. Verboven
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Haeck;F. Verboven
利用欧洲一所大型大学的丰富人事数据集，我们发现了内部劳动力市场存在的有力证据。首先，最低学术级别有一个强大的进入门槛，事实上甚至在进入教授职位之前，导致了很长的内部职业生涯。其次，工资不跟随外部工资的发展。随后，我们考虑了通过年度锦标赛组织的有关促销动态的各种激励理论。正如预期的那样，一套严格的研究和教学标准决定了晋升的速度。与此同时，行政僵化也发挥着重要作用。
Using a rich personnel data set of a large European university we find strong evidence for the existence of an internal labor market. First, there is a strong port of entry at the lowest academic rank and in fact even prior to entering professorship, resulting in very long internal careers. Second, wages do not follow external wage developments. We subsequently consider various incentive theories regarding the dynamics of promotions, as organized through annual tournaments. As expected, a rigid set of research and teaching criteria determine the speed of promotions. At the same time, administrative rigidities play an important role.