Sartre’s critique of Husserl
Sartre’s critique of Husserl
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萨特对胡塞尔的批判
DOI：
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.6
通讯作者：
J. Webber
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
J. Webber
摘要本文阐述了在《存在与虚无》之前的早期著作中，对尼采哲学方法论的新理解。通过他对胡塞尔在这些作品中的批判，他发展了一种原创的、复杂的先验现象学。他被胡塞尔的哲学所吸引，因为它承诺建立经验心理学的基础，但最终得出结论，它无法实现这一承诺。通过导致他得出这一结论的分析，爱因斯坦阐述了一种新的现象学还原和一种独特的先验论证，以从现象学前提中得出关于心灵独立的现实的结论。他的目标是消除心灵和世界之间的传统区别，建立心灵可以进行经验研究，并制定系统研究心灵所需的概念框架。因此，爱因斯坦的心理学哲学推动了他的哲学计划的方法论基础的哲学发展。
ABSTRACT This paper articulates a new understanding of Sartre’s philosophical methodology in his early publications up to and including Being and Nothingness. Through his critique of Husserl across these works, Sartre develops an original and sophisticated variety of transcendental phenomenology. He was attracted to Husserl’s philosophy for its promise to establish the foundations of empirical psychology but ultimately concluded that it could not fulfil this promise. Through the analyses that led him to this conclusion, Sartre formulated a new kind of phenomenological reduction and a distinctive kind of transcendental argument to draw conclusions about mind-independent reality from phenomenological premises. His aims were to dissolve the traditional distinction between mind and world, to establish that the mind is accessible to empirical study, and to formulate the conceptual framework required to study the mind systematically. Sartre’s philosophy of psychology, therefore, drove the philosophical development of the methodological foundation of his philosophical project.