The Blind Leading the Blind: A Third-Party Model for Bilateral Multi-issue Negotiations under Incomplete Information
The Blind Leading the Blind: A Third-Party Model for Bilateral Multi-issue Negotiations under Incomplete Information
复制标题
盲人引导盲人：不完全信息下双边多议题谈判的第三方模型
DOI：
10.1007/978-3-642-03190-8_4
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发表时间：
2009
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
K. Larson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
James Shew;K. Larson
我们研究了一个多议题协商问题，在这个问题中，代理人有关于他们对议题的偏好的私有信息。代理对实际解决方案空间的无知使得他们很难达成既公平又有效的协议。为了使这种谈判更容易，我们提出了一个框架，该框架雇用第三方作为调解人，指导代理人在有效边界上寻求公平的解决办法。为了实现这一点，我们的调解员将代理的声明合并到一个连贯的谈判协议中，该协议抑制了代理撒谎的愿望，并鼓励他们探索对双方都有效且有利可图的解决方案空间区域。
We study a multi-issue negotiation problem where agents have private information concerning their preferences over the issues. The ignorance of agents regarding the actual solution space makes it difficult for them to come to an agreement that is both fair and efficient. To make such negotiations easier, we propose a framework that employs a third-party to act as a mediator that will guide agents towards equitable solutions on the efficient frontier. To achieve this, our mediator combines the declarations of agents into a coherent negotiation protocol that dampens the desire of agents to lie and encourages them to explore regions of the solution space that are efficient and profitable for both parties.