Productivity Growth, Increasing Income Inequality and Social Insurance: The Case of China
Productivity Growth, Increasing Income Inequality and Social Insurance: The Case of China
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生产力增长、收入不平等加剧和社会保险：中国案例
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.242668
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发表时间：
2000
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
C. Leung
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Leung
本文研究了中国改革的两个突出的典型事实：改革初期的产出增长主要是由于生产率的增长，收入不平等随着时间的推移而不断扩大。本文是在一个统一的框架内理解这两个事实的初步尝试。粗略地说，它在Rebelo(1991)发展的AK模型中嵌入了一个静态道德风险问题。从积极的一面来看，研究发现，随着社会保险范围的降低，经济增长率和收入不平等程度都会增加。通过合理的参数值，该模型与中国所观察到的生产率增长、经济增长和基尼系数变化的幅度相匹配。在规范方面，我们发现完美的保险并不是最优的安排。数值模拟表明，不完善的保险制度比没有保险制度的保险制度更好。10%至25%的覆盖率可能接近最佳水平。这可能表明，即使存在道德风险，社会保险也有一些可取之处。
This paper studies two striking stylized facts about China's reform: that the output growth in the early stage of the reform is mainly due to productivity growth, and that the income inequality is increasing over time. This paper is a preliminary attempt in understanding these two facts in an unifying framework. Roughly speaking, it embeds a static moral hazard problem into the AK model developed in Rebelo (1991). On the positive side, it is found that both economic growth rate and income inequality increases when the extent of social insurance is decreased. With reasonable parameter values, the model here matches the magnitude of productivity growth, economic growth and change in Gini coefficients observed in China. On the normative side, it is found that perfect insurance cannot be hte optimal arrangement. Numerical simulations show that imperfect insurance regime can be superior to the one without. 10% to 25% coverage might be close to the optimal level. It may suggest that there can be some merit for social insurance even with moral hazard.