A game-theoretic approach for distributed power control in interference relay channels
A game-theoretic approach for distributed power control in interference relay channels
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DOI：
10.1109/twc.2009.080831
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发表时间：
2009-06
影响因子：
10.4
通讯作者：
Yi Shi;J. H. Wang;K. Letaief;R. Mallik
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yi Shi;J. H. Wang;K. Letaief;R. Mallik
利用博弈论的框架研究了高斯频率平坦干扰中继信道中的多用户功率控制问题。虽然很多注意力已经支付给高斯干扰游戏，其中的纳什均衡（NE）的唯一性的充分条件已经建立，这些类型的游戏还没有被研究的干扰中继信道的背景下。我们认为这里高斯干扰中继游戏（GIRGs），而不是分配的功率预算在一组子信道，每个球员的目标是决定最佳的功率控制策略在一组跳。我们表明，GIRG总是拥有一个独特的NE为两个玩家版本的游戏，无论任何信道实现或初始系统参数，如功率预算和噪声功率。此外，我们明确地推导出一个充分条件下，NE实现帕累托最优。为了便于分散实现，我们提出了一个分布式和异步算法。我们还证明了所提出的算法总是收敛到唯一的NE从任意的起点。然后，我们得出结论，分布式博弈论的方法表现出很大的潜力，在干扰中继信道的背景下，有资格作为一个实际上有吸引力的候选人的功率控制。
This paper considers the multiuser power control problem in Gaussian frequency-flat interference relay channels using a game-theoretic framework. While a lot of attention has been paid to Gaussian interference games, where sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium (NE) have been established, these types of games have not been studied in the context of interference relay channels. We consider here Gaussian interference relay games (GIRGs), where instead of allocating the power budget across a set of sub-channels, each player aims to decide the optimal power control strategy across a set of hops. We show that the GIRG always possesses a unique NE for a two-player version of the game, irrespective of any channel realization or initial system parameters such as power budgets and noise power. Furthermore, we derive explicitly a sufficient condition under which the NE achieves Pareto-optimality. To facilitate decentralized implementation, we propose a distributed and asynchronous algorithm. We also prove that the proposed algorithm always converges to the unique NE from an arbitrary starting point. We then conclude that the distributed game-theoretic approach exhibits great potential in the context of interference relay channels and qualifies as a practically appealing candidate for power control.