Earnings management, IPO screening and resource allocation efficiency
Earnings management, IPO screening and resource allocation efficiency
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DOI：
10.1080/21697213.2016.1144970
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发表时间：
2016-01
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jun Huang;Ting Li
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Jun Huang;Ting Li
本文以2006年至2012年上市公司为样本，以盈余管理为视角，对中国证券发行审核委员会的决策效率进行了实证检验。研究发现，IPO通过率与公司盈余管理水平呈负相关，但这种关系只存在于高水平的盈余管理公司。进一步的分析表明，当IPO公司是国有企业或得到政府的行业支持时，其IPO申请因盈余管理而被拒绝的可能性较小。同时，政治关联和业务复杂性弱化了IPO通过率与公司盈余管理之间的负相关关系。最后，我们发现，盈余管理越多的IPO公司，上市后的股票回报越低，会计业绩越差。
Abstract Employing IPO firms from 2006 to 2012 as the sample and taking the perspective of earnings management, this paper examines the decision efficiency of the Stock Issue Examination and Verification Committee (SIEVC) in China. We find that the rate of passing IPO screening is negatively correlated with firms’ earnings management, but this relationship is only found for the high-level earnings management. Further analyses show that when IPO firms are state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or receive industry support from government, their IPO applications are less likely to be rejected for earnings management. Meanwhile, political connection and business complexity weaken the negative relationship between the rate of passing the IPO screening and firms’ earnings management. Finally, we find that IPO firms with more earnings management have lower stock returns and worse accounting performance after listing.