Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
Evolution via imitation among like-minded individuals
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DOI：
10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.02.003
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发表时间：
2014-05-21
影响因子：
2
通讯作者：
Masuda, Naoki
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Masuda, Naoki
在进化博弈所涉及的社会情境中，个体在各个方面都被认为是异质的。特别是，他们可能会不同地感知到相同的游戏结果，由于异质性的特殊偏好，战斗能力，并在社会网络中的位置。在这样的群体中，个体可能会模仿成功的和相似的其他人，其中相似性是指特质适应度函数中的相似性。我提出了一个进化博弈模型的基础上的两个子种群的多种群复制动力学来描述这种情况。在所提出的模型中，成对的球员参与了一个两人的游戏作为一个良好的混合人口，模仿发生在每个球员有相同的支付矩阵的子群体。结果表明，该模型不允许任何内部平衡，这样的动态不同于其他相关的模型，如双矩阵游戏。特别是，即使在两个子群体的支付矩阵的微小差异，可以使相反的策略被稳定地选择在两个子群体中的雪堆和协调游戏。(C)2014爱思唯尔有限公司版权所有。
In social situations with which evolutionary game is concerned, individuals are considered to be heterogeneous in various aspects. In particular, they may differently perceive the same outcome of the game owing to heterogeneity in idiosyncratic preferences, fighting abilities, and positions in a social network. In such a population, an individual may imitate successful and similar others, where similarity refers to that in the idiosyncratic fitness function. I propose an evolutionary game model with two subpopulations on the basis of multipopulation replicator dynamics to describe such a situation. In the proposed model, pairs of players are involved in a two-person game as a well-mixed population, and imitation occurs within subpopulations in each of which players have the same payoff matrix. It is shown that the model does not allow any internal equilibrium such that the dynamics differs from that of other related models such as the bimatrix game. In particular, even a slight difference in the payoff matrix in the two subpopulations can make the opposite strategies to be stably selected in the two subpopulations in the snowdrift and coordination games. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.