The Signaling Effect of Emission Taxes Under International Duopoly
The Signaling Effect of Emission Taxes Under International Duopoly
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DOI：
10.1007/s10640-018-0220-5
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发表时间：
2019-03-01
影响因子：
5.9
通讯作者：
Miyaoka，Akira
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Miyaoka，Akira
本文分析了在企业间信息不对称的情况下，国际古诺双寡头垄断下的均衡排污税问题。在不知道对方企业的生产成本的情况下，各国政府可以将排放税作为本国企业竞争力的信号。我们发现，由于这种信号效应，每个国家的均衡排放税和预期福利可以高于企业之间对称信息下的水平，甚至高于政府非战略性地将税率设定为污染的（预期）边际损害（即，庇古税（Pigouvian tax）。我们的研究结果表明，企业之间的信息不对称的存在，可以减轻战略环境决策中的“竞底”。
We analyze equilibrium emission taxes under international Cournot duopoly in the presence of asymmetric information between firms. When each firm does not know the production cost of its rival located in the other country, the government of each country can use its emission tax as a signal of the competitiveness of its domestic firm. We show that, owing to this signaling effect, the equilibrium emission tax and expected welfare of each country can be higher than those under symmetric information between firms or even higher than those obtained if the governments were to non-strategically set the tax rate equal to the (expected) marginal damage from pollution (i.e., the Pigouvian tax level). Our results suggest that the presence of asymmetric information between firms can mitigate a “race to the bottom” in strategic environmental policymaking.