Exclusive Dealing and Entry When Buyers Compete
Exclusive Dealing and Entry When Buyers Compete
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买家竞争时的独家交易和进入
DOI：
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Massimo Motta
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Fumagalli;Massimo Motta
Rasmusen et al.（1991）和Segal and Whisper（2000）表明，现有的垄断者可能会通过利用买方之间的外部性来排除更有效率的竞争者的进入。我们发现，他们的结果举行，只有当下游的买家之间的竞争不存在或足够弱。在激烈的下游竞争中，在位者无法补偿从更有效率的进入者那里购买的异常买家。任何这样的买家都会变得更有竞争力，增加产量--从而引发进入--并以牺牲与在位者签订独家协议的买家的利益为代价增加利润。因此，排他性交易不能阻止有效进入。
Rasmusen et al. (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) show that an incumbent monopolist might exclude entry of a more efficient competitor, by exploiting externalities among buyers. We show that their results hold only when downstream competition among buyers does not exist or is weak enough. Under fierce downstream competition, the incumbent cannot compensate a deviant buyer who buys from the more efficient entrant. Any such buyer will become more competitive and increase their output – thus triggering entry – and profits at the expense of buyers who sign an exclusive deal with the incumbent. Hence, exclusive deals cannot deter efficient entry.