Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources
Property Rights, Regulatory Capture, and Exploitation of Natural Resources
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产权、监管捕获和自然资源开发
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
3.6
通讯作者：
Corbett A. Grainger
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
C. Costello;Corbett A. Grainger
我们研究了个别采掘企业的产权强度如何影响监管者对自然资源开采率的选择。监管机构被建模为当前和未来资源收集者之间的中介，而不是生产者和消费者之间的中介，就像传统的监管捕获范式一样。当现有资源使用者的产权薄弱时，他们就有动力向监管机构施压，要求其允许以低效的速度开采资源。主要的理论预测——更强的个人产权将导致监管者选择更经济有效的提取途径——已经用来自全球渔业的新面板数据进行了实证检验。利用“份额共享”实施时间的变化，以及采用工具变量策略，我们发现监管机构在管理企业拥有强大产权的资源方面明显更为保守；对于历史上被过度开发的资源来说，这一点尤为明显。
We study how the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator’s choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource. The regulator is modeled as an intermediary between current and future resource harvesters rather than between producers and consumers, as in the traditional regulatory capture paradigm. When incumbent resource users have weak property rights, they have an incentive to pressure the regulator to allow resource extraction at an inefficiently rapid rate. The main theoretical prediction—that stronger individual property rights will lead the regulator to choose more economically efficient extraction paths—is tested empirically with novel panel data from global fisheries. Exploiting the variation in timing of Catch Share implementation, as well as employing an instrumental variables strategy, we find that regulators are significantly more conservative in managing resources for which firms have strong property rights; this is especially pronounced for resources that have been historically overexploited.