Self-knowledge and the KK principle
Self-knowledge and the KK principle
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自知之明和KK原则
作者：
Conor McHugh
我认为，出于原则性认知原因，所谓的 KK 原理的一个版本是正确的。这并不像通常认为的那样需要内在主义，而是与广泛的认识论观点相一致。我所捍卫的原则的版本指出，在某些正常条件下，知道 p 意味着能够知道你知道 p。我对这一原则的论证源于对如何才能知道你知道某事的反思，而不是对一般知识的条件的反思。事实证明，知道你知道 p 与心理自我认识的情况非常相似，比如知道你相信 p：除了你相信 p 本身的理由之外，它不需要任何理由。在这样的论证中，我并不依赖于任何对知识的一般性解释，而仅依赖于某些看似合理且被广泛接受的认识论假设。
I argue that a version of the so-called KK principle is true for principled epistemic reasons; and that this does not entail access internalism, as is commonly supposed, but is consistent with a broad spectrum of epistemological views. The version of the principle I defend states that, given certain normal conditions, knowing p entails being in a position to know that you know p. My argument for the principle proceeds from reflection on what it would take to know that you know something, rather than from reflection on the conditions for knowledge generally. Knowing that you know p, it emerges, is importantly similar to cases of psychological self-knowledge like knowing that you believe p: it does not require any grounds other than your grounds for believing p itself. In so arguing, I do not rely on any general account of knowledge, but only on certain plausible and widely accepted epistemological assumptions.