Bailouts in Federations: Is a Hard Budget Constraint Always Best?
Bailouts in Federations: Is a Hard Budget Constraint Always Best?
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联邦救助：严格的预算限制总是最好的吗？
DOI：
10.1111/j.1468-2354.2008.00490.x
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发表时间：
2008
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Ben Lockwood
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. Besfamille;Ben Lockwood
本文分析了联邦政府的硬预算约束和软预算约束，其中中央政府和地方政府之间存在道德风险问题。地方政府可以通过付出高昂的努力来避免中央的救助。在这种情况下，硬预算约束并不总是最优的，因为它可能为高度努力提供过多的激励，从而阻碍具有社会效率的投资。因此，硬预算约束可能意味着软预算约束下出现的相反类型的低效率，其中公共池问题可能导致低效的低努力和过度投资。
This article analyses hard and soft budget constraints in a federation, where there is a moral hazard problem between the central and the regional governments. Regional governments can avoid a bailout from the center by exerting costly effort. In this setting, a hard budget constraint is not always optimal because it can provide excessive incentives for high effort, and thus discourage investment that is socially efficient. Thus, a hard budget constraint can imply the opposite kind of inefficiency that emerges under a soft budget constraint, where the common pool problem can give rise to inefficiently low effort and overinvestment.