Knowledge‐first functionalism
Knowledge‐first functionalism
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知识至上的功能主义
DOI：
10.1111/phis.12152
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发表时间：
2019
影响因子：
0.7
通讯作者：
M. Simion
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
M. Simion
本文有两个目的。第一点至关重要：我确定了一套规范的必要性帐户的合理的信念，我认为，突出的知识第一的观点有困难，以满足他们。第二，我认为，我的首选帐户，知识第一功能主义，是更可取的规范的理由，其现存的竞争对手。这种解释认为，认识上合理的信念是由正常运作的认知过程所产生的信念，这些认知过程具有生成知识的认识功能。
This paper has two aims. The first is critical: I identify a set of normative desiderata for accounts of justified belief and I argue that prominent knowledge first views have difficulties meeting them. Second, I argue that my preferred account, knowledge first functionalism, is preferable to its extant competitors on normative grounds. This account takes epistemically justified belief to be belief generated by properly functioning cognitive processes that have generating knowledge as their epistemic function.