A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
A Property of Solutions to Linear Monopoly Problems
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线性垄断问题解的一个性质
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
Gregory Pavlov
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作者：
Gregory Pavlov
我们将Riley和Zeckhauser(1983)的“无讨价还价”结果推广到买方估价为平稳分布的线性多产品垄断问题。特别地，我们证明了卖家在对所有分配都属于可行集的边界的机制进行优化时是没有损失的。当费用足够低时，可以进一步限制潜在最优机制的集合：最优机制只使用来自可行集合的“东北”边界的分配和零分配。
We extend the “no-haggling” result of Riley and Zeckhauser (1983) to the class of linear multiproduct monopoly problems when the buyer’s valuations are smoothly distributed. In particular, we show that there is no loss for the seller in optimizing over mechanisms such that all allocations belong to the boundary of the feasible set. The set of potentially optimal mechanisms can be further restricted when the costs are sufficiently low: the optimal mechanisms use only allocations from the “north-east” boundary of the feasible set and the null allocation.