Why Good Thoughts Block Better Ones
Why Good Thoughts Block Better Ones
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DOI：
10.1038/scientificamerican0314-74
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发表时间：
2014-03-01
影响因子：
3
通讯作者：
McLeod, Peter
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Bilalic, Merim;McLeod, Peter
76 《科学美国人》，2014 年 3 月 在一项 1942 年的经典实验中，美国心理学家亚伯拉罕·卢钦斯 (Abraham Luchins) 要求志愿者通过在脑海中想象水壶来进行一些基本数学计算。例如，给定三个空容器，每个容器都有不同的容量（21、127 和三个单位的水），参与者必须弄清楚如何在容器之间转移液体以精确测量 100 个单位。他们可以根据需要多次装满和清空每个罐子，但他们必须将容器装满到极限。解决方案是首先将第二个罐子装满 127 个单位，然后将其倒入第一个罐子中，除去 21 个单位，剩下 106 个单位，最后将第三个罐子装满两次，减去 6 个单位，剩下 100 个单位。卢钦斯向志愿者们提出了几个问题，这些问题可以通过基本相同的三个步骤来解决；他们很快就完成了。然而，当他给他们一个比之前的任务更简单、更快速的解决方案时，他们却看不到它。这一次，卢钦斯要求参与者使用可容纳 23、49 和 3 个液体单位的容器量出 20 个单位的水。解决方案很明显，对吧？只需将第一个罐子装满，然后将其清空到第三个罐子中即可：23–3= 20。然而，卢钦斯实验中的许多人坚持用老方法解决更简单的问题，将第二个容器倒入第一个罐子，然后倒入第三个罐子两次：49–23–3–3= 20。当卢钦斯给他们一个有两步解决方案的问题时，但无法使用志愿者已经习惯的三步方法来解决，他们给了起来，说这是不可能的。水壶实验是“安装效应”最著名的例子之一：人类大脑顽固地倾向于坚持使用熟悉的解决方案来解决问题（首先想到的解决方案），而忽略其他选择。通常这种类型的思维是一种有用的启发式方法。一旦你找到了一种成功的方法，比如剥大蒜，那么每次需要新的丁香时就没有必要尝试一系列不同的技术。然而，这种认知捷径的问题在于，它有时会让人们看不到比他们已经知道的更有效或更合适的解决方案。在卢钦斯早期工作的基础上，心理学家复制了
76 Scientific American, March 2014 a classic 1942 experiment, american psychologist abraham luchins asked volunteers to do some basic math by picturing water jugs in their mind. Given three empty containers, for example, each with a different capacity—21, 127 and three units of water—the participants had to figure out how to transfer liquid between the containers to measure out precisely 100 units. They could fill and empty each jug as many times as they wanted, but they had to fill the vessels to their limits. The solution was to first fill the second jug to its capacity of 127 units, then empty it into the first to remove 21 units, leaving 106, and finally to fill the third jug twice to subtract six units for a remainder of 100. Luchins presented his volunteers with several more problems that could be solved with essentially the same three steps; they made quick work of them. Yet when he gave them a problem with a simpler and faster solution than the previous tasks, they failed to see it.This time, Luchins asked the participants to measure out 20 units of water using containers that could hold 23, 49 and three liquid units. The solution is obvious, right? Simply fill the first jug and empty it into the third one: 23–3= 20. Yet many people in Luchins’s experiment persisted to solve the easier problem the old way, emptying the second container into the first and then into the third twice: 49–23–3–3= 20. And when Luchins gave them a problem that had a two-step solution—but could not be solved using the three-step method to which the volunteers had become accustomed—they gave up, saying it was impossible. The water jug experiment is one of the most famous examples of the Einstellung effect: the human brain’s dogged tendency to stick with a familiar solution to a problem—the one that first comes to mind—and to ignore alternatives. Often this type of thinking is a useful heuristic. Once you have hit on a successful method to, say, peel garlic, there is no point in trying an array of different techniques every time you need a new clove. The trouble with this cognitive shortcut, however, is that it sometimes blinds people to more efficient or appropriate solutions than the ones they already know. Building on Luchins’s early work, psychologists replicated