Retrospective Voting and Party Polarization

Retrospective Voting and Party Polarization
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回顾性投票和政党两极分化

DOI:
10.1111/iere.12348
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发表时间:
2018
期刊:
ERN: Bargaining Theory (Topic)
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
Demian Pouzo
Demian Pouzo
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
--
作者:
Ignacio Esponda;Demian Pouzo

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我们提供了一个新的和有利的角度对选民的天真和政党两极分化。我们对比复杂的(纳什)与回顾性投票在一个模型中,双方承诺的政策。回顾性选民并不理解国家与政策结果之间的映射关系;相反,他们只是投票给在均衡中确定的表现最好的政党。我们发现,各方有动机在回顾性投票,相比纳什,。此外,由于政策与基本面之间的更好匹配,这种两极分化往往导致更高的福利。
We provide a new and favorable perspective on voter naivete and party polarization. We contrast sophisticated (Nash) versus retrospective voting in a model where two parties commit to policies. Retrospective voters do not understand the mapping between states and outcomes induced by a policy; instead, they simply vote for the party that delivers the highest observed performance, as determined in equilibrium. We show that parties have an incentive to polarize under retrospective, compared to Nash, voting. Moreover, this polarization often results in higher welfare due to a better match between policies and fundamentals.
DOI: 10.2307/2149903
发表时间: 1981-01
期刊: --
影响因子: --
作者:
M. Fiorina
通讯作者: M. Fiorina