Threshold-Based Forward Guidance: Hedging the Zero Bound
Threshold-Based Forward Guidance: Hedging the Zero Bound
复制标题
基于阈值的前瞻指引：对冲零界
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.2682418
复制
发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Matt Waldron
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Lena Boneva;R. Harrison;Matt Waldron
“基于货币政策的前瞻性指导”（TBFG）是一种国家或有承诺，将政策利率保持在零下限，直到宏观经济变量突破特定的“阈值”。虽然这种指导在实践中得到了实施，但人们对这一政策在理论上如何运作知之甚少。本文填补了这一空白，研究阈值为基础的指导作为一种工具，以改善在一般均衡框架内的零界的结果。政策制定者很少提倡使用TBFG来提供刺激，部分原因是他们对自己是否有能力做出时间不一致的行为表示怀疑。我们表明，TBFG可以用来提供临时刺激，同时也限制了政策承诺的时间不一致性。我们还表明，存在一个独特的均衡，需要政策制定者指定如何阈值应被解释，以及他们的价值。阈值条件的最佳设计取决于那些在稳定产出和通货膨胀之间引起权衡的冲击和那些不引起权衡的冲击的相对重要性。通过适当选择阈值，TBFG优于纯粹基于日历时间的前瞻性指导，并接近于模仿最优承诺策略下的结果。
"Threshold-based forward guidance" (TBFG) is a state-contingent commitment to hold the policy rate at the zero lower bound until macroeconomic variables breach particular "thresholds". Though such guidance has been implemented in practice, little is known about how this policy works in theory. This paper fills that gap by studying threshold-based guidance as a tool to improve outcomes at the zero bound within a general equilibrium framework. Policymakers have rarely advocated using TBFG to provide stimulus, in part reflecting skepticism about their ability to commit credibly to time inconsistent behavior. We show that TBFG can be used to provide temporary stimulus, while also limiting the time inconsistency of policy promises. We also show that existence of a unique equilibrium requires the policymaker to specify how the thresholds should be interpreted, as well as their values. The optimal design of the threshold conditions depends on the relative importance of those shocks that induce a trade-off between stabilizing output and inflation and those that do not. With an appropriate choice of thresholds, TBFG outperforms forward guidance based purely on calendar time and comes close to mimicking outcomes under optimal commitment policy.
声誉和流动性
DOI：
--
发表时间：
2018
期刊：
影响因子：
--
作者：
佐藤祐己;瀧下 晶子, 出口 禎子;佐藤祐己;Raluca Toma;佐藤祐己;佐藤祐己;Raluca Toma
通讯作者：
Raluca Toma