Foreign Investment and Shared Sovereignty
Foreign Investment and Shared Sovereignty
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
A. Armstrong
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作者：
A. Armstrong
本研究调查双边投资条约(BITS)中包含的法律条款如何影响OECD国家的外国直接投资流入。这与现有文献在两个方面形成了鲜明对比：首先，我们审查了双边投资条约中包含的单独的投资者保护条款；其次，我们仅涵盖经合组织经济体。我们还考虑到优惠贸易协定中投资条款的存在。另外还注意了贸易在重力模型中的作用，该模型使用泊松伪极大似然估计器进行估计。我们发现，对外国直接投资流动最重要的是纳入双边投资条约所载的投资者国家争端解决条款。特别是，ISDS所载限制性条款之间的相互作用对投资流入最为重要。我们的实证分析表明，同时具有约束性规则和广泛覆盖债权的ISDS条款的双边投资条约可能会使投资流增加73%。我们认为，这是第一项表明ISDS条款对发达经济体直接投资流入的重要性的研究。然而，纳入限制性条款可能会被解读为放弃主权控制权，从而在政治上引发争议。
This study investigates how the legal provisions contained in Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) affect foreign direct investment inflows in OECD countries. This stands in contrast to the existing literature on two counts: first, we examine separate investor protection provisions contained in BITs; and second we cover OECD economies only. We also take account of the existence of investment clauses in Preferential Trade Agreements. Additional attention is paid to the role of trade in the gravity model, estimated using a Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator. We find that it is the inclusion of Investor State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) provisions contained within BITs that matter most for foreign direct investment flows. In particular, the interaction of restrictive provisions contained in ISDS matters most for investment inflows. Our empirical analysis shows that BITs with ISDS provisions with both binding rules and a wide coverage for claims may increase investment flows by 73%. We believe that this is the first study to show the importance of ISDS provisions for direct investment inflows in advanced economies. However, the inclusion restrictive provisions can be interpreted as ceding sovereign control, making them politically controversial.